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1 Introduction 
Simulation has emerged as one of the most important means of assurance for Machine Learning (ML) 
embedded in control systems, but there are many challenges and areas of uncertainty surrounding its use. 
In this document we present a summary of issues as well as experience gained from the TIGARS project 
demonstrator in the autonomous vehicle domain. 
2 Simulation and dynamic testing 
Simulation is an approach widely used and encouraged, e.g., by the NHSTA [1], to train and verify the 
performance of ML used in autonomous vehicles. Simulation can be performed at many different levels of 
abstraction, some of which are described below: 
ì Fully virtual simulation â where the ML is executed in isolation with fully electronic input data and data 
capture. For example, running an image classification Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) on a PC 
with sample image file. 
ì Hardware in the Loop (HIL) â where the ML is run on representative hardware, however the inputs and 
outputs are managed virtually or in an artificial environment. For example, putting an autonomous 
vehicle inside a room with a bank of monitors and capturing decisions via data logging. Simpler cut 
down versions may also be used, e.g., a sub-system in isolation but with hardware sensors. 
ì Real-world limited trial â where the autonomous system is run on representative hardware but in a 
controlled environment, such as on a test track. 
ì Real-world trial â where the autonomous system is put into the public environment, with no control of 
test conditions. 
Simulation may require substantial computer resources to create an environment with enough fidelity to 
gather meaningful results.  
A serious assurance challenge is the amount of experience and testing needed in an autonomous vehicle to 
gain confidence. To match a human driver fatality rate of 2 - 3 SeU bLOOLRQ PLOeV LW LV eVWLPaWed WhaW çfully 
autonomous vehicles would have to be driven hundreds of millions of miles and sometimes hundreds of billions 
of miles to demonstrate their safety in terms of fatalities and injuries. Under even aggressive testing 
assumptions, existing fleets would take tens and sometimes hundreds of years to drive these miles — an 
impossible proposition if the aim is to demonstrate performance prior to releasing them for consumer use. Our 
findings demonstrate that developers of this technology and third-party testers cannot simply drive their way to 
safety.è [2]. This is reinforced by Koopman in [3]. 
Therefore, simulation without resorting to real-world trials is seen as a practical way to gain assurance 
regarding the performance of an autonomous vehicle although it is an open question how his can be 
combined with other assurance evidence to give sufficient confidence in the safety of the system (the overall 
assurance is discussed in [4]). Additionally, only using real-world trials is not generally considered an 
ethical or a responsible choice, at least not without some reasonable assurance of safe performance before 
the vehicle is in contact with the general public and also for the occupants. 
It should be noted that simulation discussions in this document are limited to simulation environments for 
verification and reinforcement learning of ML, rather than, for example, simulations of overall traffic flow 
once autonomy has been incorporated. 
Table 1 below summarises the pros and cons of different combinations of virtual and real-world simulation. 
In practical terms it may be desirable to use different types at different stages of ML development. This 
would be dependent on the risk associated with the system, as that would inform the amount of evidence 
required to demonstrate adequate safety. 
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Environment  ML Strengths Weaknesses 
Virtual Virtual Can control and model 
many different environment 
options, which may be hard 
to replicate in real world 
testing 
Can create accident 
sequences to test corner 
cases without risk of 
accident 
Potentially cheap and quick 
Can do early in lifecycle to 
assess performance 
Can monitor every aspect 
of performance 
Can use for reinforcement 
learning 
Potentially strong 
repeatability 
Easier to detect how/where 
faults occurred with 
monitoring 
Unrealistic input data e.g., computer 
generated environment1 or modelled 
sensor functionality which may not 
match the resolution and real-time 
performance of a real sensor 
Extensive computer resources will be 
required to achieve the performance 
required for adequate modelling and 
collecting data e.g., in terms of 
processing power and fast access 
memory 
ML may not perform this way in real life 
Hard to involve user if needed 
Potentially unrepresentative results 
(e.g., no feedback from bumpy surface, 
compromise of equipment from wet 
surface, temperature changes) 
Virtual/Artificial On target 
hardware 
(Hardware In 
Loop (HIL)) 
Can control many different 
environment options 
Can create accident 
sequences with very 
limited or no risk 
Can involve end user 
Gain trust in ML hardware 
Potentially strong 
repeatability 
Easier to detect how/where 
faults occurred with 
monitoring 
Unrealistic input data â ML may be real 
but some of the input data may not be 
realistic e.g., if working in a room with 
lots of monitors 
Computing power required may be large 
Outputs may be more realistic but still 
constrained by environment (e.g., no 
actual movement or slower/faster 
responses) 
User may not behave as they would in 
real environment or may have 
simulation sickness [5] 
Real world but 
controlled e.g., 
test track 
On target 
hardware 
Input data is real and may 
contain unanticipated 
events 
Can get useful feedback on 
performance with low risk 
to third party 
Can involve users if needed 
Less control over the environment 
Much harder to repeat results 
Harder to detect how/where faults 
occurred 
                                                             
1 Consider the situation where the simulation provides conflicting and unrealistic sensor data e.g., blocky low-resolution models, 
moving trees and unrealistically fast pedestrians [6]. Whilst it might be useful for the ML to identify this as invalid input data, if used 
for training care will be needed not to reinforce invalid behaviour. 
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Environment  ML Strengths Weaknesses 
Real world 
trials 
On target 
hardware 
Input data is real and may 
contain unanticipated 
events 
Can involve users if needed 
No control over environment 
Riskier to third parties depending on 
mitigations in place 
Hard to repeat results 
Hard to detect how/where faults 
occurred 
Table 1: Simulation variants and their strengths and weaknesses 
3 Simulation demonstrators 
This section provides an overview of the simulation and dynamic testing performed on the TIGARS 
Evaluation Vehicle (TEV) golf cart, with an acceleration control system containing ML. The ML used was a 
version of the You Only Look Once (YOLO) [7] CNN which has been trained to detect people and vehicles, as 
well as other objects. The system under test uses a combination of distance calculations via parallax 
images, LiDAR and image classification to determine speed and acceleration settings. The system 
responds to other vehicles and pedestrians in its environment depending on their type(s) and distance from 
the vehicle. 
3.1 Purpose 
The purpose of our testing was as follows: 
ì verification of the effectiveness of existing testing methods for systems including ML models. 
ì elucidation of the gaps between actual and simulation environments for testing systems including ML 
models 
ì elucidation of the gaps between testing conventional systems (Non-AI) and systems including ML 
models 
The tests were performed early in the development lifecycle of the system. 
3.2 Environment 
Tests were conducted in the following two simulation environments: 
ì TEV test room - Combination of Virtual and Artificial Environment with HIL  
ì Virtualized Verification into automatic Driving (ViViD) - Fully Virtual Environment 
 
Figure 1: TEV test room configuration diagram 
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Figure 2: ViViD configuration diagram 
3.3 TEV test room environment 
These tests were conducted using a chassis dynamo. In the chassis dynamo environment, the TEV runs 
over the dynamo rollers. During the test, an environmental situation is reproduced by installing a panel of a 
person or a car in front of the golf cart. Since the space in which the chassis dynamo can be used is 
narrower than real life, the threshold values of the distance from the front vehicle when accelerating, 
decelerating, or stopping were adjusted proportionally. 
 
Figure 3: Chassis dynamo environment 
3.4 ViViD environment 
ViViD provides a fully virtual simulation environment for the TEV golf cart. Using ViViD, sensor information 
can be acquired by User Datagram Protocol (UDP) communication. It can be configured so that obstacles 
such as vehicles and pedestrians can be inserted into the environment, as well as failure injection within 
sensor data. The tests were carried out with the TEV driving on a typical road as shown below. 
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Figure 4: ViViD environment 
4 Test cases and results 
4.1 Test content 
In order to verify whether the test methods were effective for the system including the ML model, test items 
were created as follows: 
ì normal scenarios were created based on system design specifications 
ì scenarios for failure, performance limitation, and misuse were created based on the results of safety 
analysis performed when the system concept was created 
The created test items were further divided according to whether or not they could be tested in test room 
and ViViD environments, and the tests were carried out. 
4.2 Lessons learned from running the experiments 
This section describes the TEV experimental results and our analysis. 
4.2.1 Lessons from the ViViD environment 
The system on the TEV uses comparisons of distance information from the object detection and LiDAR. 
There were many issues with timing in the ViViD environment which impacted on the effectiveness of the 
testing. 
The LiDAR simulation software was too slow to be used at full fidelity in ViViD. As a result only part of the 
LiDAR data (the front ±15 degrees) was used to ensure a similar execution time as the real system. This 
was justified as it had no impact on the test cases being run within the ViViD environment. 
A very highly specced machine was required to run the test application and simulator together, otherwise 
there were unacceptable delays sending the video output to the test application and in running the YOLO 
component. Even then, there were issues providing a predictable frame rate from the simulator, since only 
approximately 57 seconds of real-time data could be processed in around 1 minute. This had a cumulative 
effect on the simulation. 
There were further complications with variations in the execution cycle, which changed from test to test. 
This meant that the tests were not repeatable. Only a rigid real-time execution of the simulator would have 
solved this, something that was impractical with off the shelf software. An attempt was made to lock-step 
time stamps from the LiDAR and object detection with the slowest input data, but the overall time lag 
meant this was not a complete solution.   
One important knock-on effect of the lack of repeatability is on regression testing. Tests cases re-run on a 
changed system cannot be assumed to execute with the changed functionality as the only variant, so the 
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results of regression testing would need to be closely examined to ensure the results observed are valid 
and representative. 
4.2.2 Results from the TEV test room environment 
As the laboratory environment was small, the functionality of the software was adjusted in proportion to the 
size, i.e. the distance measurements and speeds were reduced. However, this had a knock-on effect on the 
overall response timing of the system which needs further analysis. 
Some other issues arose as the TEV documentation did not describe all golf cart connectivity in detail, and 
a trial and error approach was needed to setup the CAN communication bus and to connect the required 
wiring.  
To ensure that the autonomous control systems were working, the TEV was run with no object, within the 
braking distance (safety) range, for the vision systems to detect. The aim was to see if TEV would 
successfully accelerate to its target maximum speed and maintain that speed. The TEV did accelerate to its 
planned maximum speed and maintained this speed on the chassis dynamo; this showed us that the 
default planning behaviour of the TEV was working. 
Then the autonomous systemås responses to a vehicle being detected ahead at various distances were 
tested. Its behaviour should be adaptive, where the TEV target speed should reduce when the distance to 
the vehicle in front reduces too much allowing the vehicle in front to increase the gap between them before 
the TEV accelerates again to its target speed, and if the distance enters the safety region, the TEV should 
brake until it comes to a full stop. In practice we found that the detection rate of the vehicle was low, and 
the experiments with vehicle detection were almost impossible within the test room setup. During the 
experiments, a panel was used with the back of a car printed on to it to trigger the vehicle to stop, but the 
panel used had a lot of blank white space around the car (printed on the panel). This seemed to confuse 
YOLO and there were many cases in which the entire panel was recognized as a çbedè instead of a car. 
Occasionally, YOLO was sensitive to other extraneous items in the test environment as well (e.g., additional 
eTXLSPeQW ZaV LdeQWLfLed aV çfULdgeè). The çbedè cOaVVLfLcaWLRQ is most likely due to YOLO being trained on 
images with different context; for future experiments, we think removing the blank spaces or printing a car 
LQ cRQWe[W (RQ a URad) fRU Whe bacNgURXQd ZRXOd PaNe YOLOåV detection rate more effective. HRZeYeU, çcaUè 
was often also detected in the images but with a lower confidence value, so an alternative is to remove the 
çbedè cOaVVLfLcation output from YOLO (leaving the neural network weights intact but taking the second or 
third result). ThLV W\Se Rf LVVXe ZaVQåW VeeQ with the ViViD experiments and it shows the importance of 
performing a varied testing programme to find more unexpected results. 
In terms of measuring performance, we found there were discrepancies in the distance measurements 
obtained when integrating the results from YOLO with the distance detection results from the RoboVision 
stereo camera, and this was more noticeable at a close distance. There was also a problem with 
consistency over adjacent frames, as even when the object was at a fixed, safe, distance, it was sometimes 
judged to be too close and a braking instruction was sent. 
Currently the present golf cart behaviour means that it cannot be made to accelerate again until it stops 
completely after sending a single safety brake instruction, therefore it will always decelerate and stop, even 
if the target speed has increased after the brake command was sent. This highlighted there is an issue with 
the resilience specification, as a single event will cause the golf cart to spuriously brake. A proposed 
solution is for the system to be updated to only react after a number of brake signals are sent consecutively. 
We found that small scale laboratory experiments were not easy and encountered problems we did not 
expect. For example, after scaling the parameters of the tests due to the small amount of laboratory space 
available, the TEV then experienced large variations in the acquired distance from the golf cart vision 
sensors. The sensors had had relatively high accuracy when detecting objects at a distance originally 
assumed in the TEV specification. However, as it is complex and expensive to prepare a testing environment 
that is very similar to the actual deployment environment (e.g., test tracks or large scale experiments) a 
ägRRdå VLPXOaWRU Pa\ be beWWeU VXLWed LQ VRPe caVeV and was still felt to provide value. 
  
TIGARS  
21 January 2020 D5.6.5 v2.0    FINAL     Project Ref: 01/18/05 Page 9/10 
Another issue found was a case in which an obstacle in the blind spot range of the camera could not be 
detected by the LiDAR, or was detected with low distance accuracy. The LiDAR is part of a safety monitor 
for the TEV, identifying items in the cameraås blind spot and overriding if safety distance is breached. To 
reduce detection issues in the test room, the installed obstacle was moved from its initial position so that 
the LiDAR could detect it and send the brake signal. However our analysis of LiDAR data log showed the 
TEV should have stopped with much earlier timing than it did in the tests, and so further to determine 
analysis potential causes of the issue is required. 
It should be noted that the problems çdetecWLRQ UaWe Rf YehLcOe LV ORZè, çcannot accelerate again after 
VeQdLQg a bUaNe LQVWUXcWLRQè, and çcannot detecW RbVWacOeV LQ Whe bOLQd VSRW UaQge Rf Whe caPeUaè did not 
occur in the ViViD environments and only became apparent in the lab testing. This highlighted the 
importance of performing small scale lab testing as part of the testing trials. These were not problems with 
the control algorithm (which was the focus of the ViViD testing) but instead were differences in the assumed 
environment and behaviour from the actual behaviour and supported environment of the COTS equipment. 
4.2.3 Common findings 
Understanding the correctness of the results was greatly improved by drawing the detection range on the 
input images. This was true of both the ViViD and chassis dynamo testing. 
Both sets of tests highlighted problems with the parallax information being provided by the object detection 
software which had a large amount of dispersion, particularly with close objects and depending on how 
many objects were detected. This indicated improvements were needed to the distance calculation 
algorithms. 
5 Conclusions and recommendations 
Simulation has emerged as one of the most important means of assurance for ML embedded in control 
systems, but there are many challenges and areas of uncertainty surrounding its use. Different 
combinations of virtual and real-world simulations can be used and, in practical terms, it may be desirable 
to use different types at different stages of ML development. This would be dependent on the risk 
associated with the system, as that would inform the amount of evidence required to demonstrate adequate 
safety. The Tigars case study provides some insights into the pragmatic issues in using simulation on real 
projects in which an experimental vehicle was being built from off the shelf components integrated with 
bespoke software, by a sub-system developer.  
The simulation studies on the project uncovered a lot of issues, many of which were unrelated to the ML but 
instead undermined confidence in the test environment and equipment. Hence, even if the test results are 
as expected it is not clear if we can trust them. Some of the findings are not new, for example, uncertainty 
in COTS equipment is a known issue, but this along with the combination of unproven ML technology with 
unproven testing methodology and equipment means establishing a compelling assurance case is 
additionally challenging. 
The following recommendations are made from this work: 
ì Simulation can have many roles in the development and assurance lifecycle: the roles of the different 
simulation variants should be specified and justified. 
ì Confidence in the simulation environment needs to be established. In other words, how much we can 
trust it, and how much do we need to trust it. This will include confidence in any simulation software (in 
the quality of its construction), in the fidelity of the sensor data compared to real-life, and hence our 
trust in the results produced (both positive and negative). Although many tools are available off the shelf 
to support simulation, in our experience, they did not perform as anticipated (ViViD had many timing 
issues) and they may not have been developed to the quality traditionally expected for safety critical 
systems testing. 
ì Adjustments in system behaviour may be needed to accommodate the simulation environment and 
these will need to be justified so that test evidence can be used in the overall assurance cases. 
ì Additional findings should be sought from the test cases. The HIL testing uncovered an undocumented 
feature of the golf cart where it would come to a complete halt rather than allow a controlled slow down 
  
TIGARS 
Towards Identifying and closing Gaps in Assurance of autonomous Road vehicleS 
Project Ref: 01/18/05 
Adelard Ref: W/3021/138008/22 
 
 
 
21 January 2020 D5.6.6 v2.0     FINAL     Project Reference: 01/18/05 Page 1/12 
 
24 Waterside 
44â48 Wharf Road 
London 
N1 7UX 
T +44 20 7832 5850 
F +44 20 7832 5870 
E office@adelard.com 
W www.adelard.com 
 TIGARS TOPIC NOTE 6: DEFENCE IN DEPTH 
AND DIVERSITY 
Summary 
This TIGARS Topic Note discusses defence in depth and diversity for autonomous 
vehicles. We provide background on diversity and some guidance on the deployment of 
the use of defence in depth and diversity for these types of systems based on the case 
studies performed during the TIGARS project. 
Authors 
Robin Bloomfield 
Gareth Fletcher 
Peter Popov 
 
Copyright © 2020 
 
 Use of Document 
The document is made available as a resource for the community, providing all 
use is adequately acknowledge and cited. 
This document provides a snapshot of work in progress. We welcome feedback 
and interest in this work. Please contact the authors or 
admin.tigars@adelard.com 
 
Acknowledgement 
This project is partially supported by the Assuring Autonomy International 
PURJUaPPH, a SaUWQHUVKLS bHWZHHQ LOR\GåV RHJLVWHU FRXQGaWLRQ aQG WKH 
University of York. Adelard acknowledges the additional support of the UK 
Department for Transport. 
 
  
TIGARS  
21 January 2020 D5.6.6 v2.0     FINAL      Project Reference: 01/18/05 Page 2/12 
Contents 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 3 
2 Defence in depth and diversity ........................................................................ 3 
3 Defence in depth and diversity in TIGARS ....................................................... 5 
3.1 Defence in depth and diversity studies on the TEV .............................. 5 
3.2 Neural network ensembles ................................................................... 6 
3.2.1 Regression faults in neural network ensembles..................... 7 
4 Recommendations ........................................................................................... 9 
5 Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 9 
Appendix A ... .......................................................................................................... 11 
Recent work on difficulty and ensembles ..................................................... 11 
Tables 
Table 1: Defence in depth and diversity: Gaps and Challenges............................... 5 
Table 2: Truth table for an adjudicator ................................................................... 12 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Experimental results on diversity ............................................................. 4 
Figure 2: Experimental results on diversity improvement factor ........................... 4 
Figure 3: Fragment of TEV architecture ................................................................... 6 
Figure 4: Asymmetric diversity model architecture ................................................ 7 
FLJXUH 5: AQ LOOXVWUaWLRQ RI çUHJUHVVLRQ IaXOWVè of a DNN subjected to retraining . 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TIGARS  
21 January 2020 D5.6.6 v2.0     FINAL      Project Reference: 01/18/05 Page 3/12 
1 Introduction 
This TIGARS Topic Paper discusses defence in depth and diversity for autonomous vehicles. We provide 
background on diversity and some guidance on the deployment of the use of defence in depth and diversity 
for these types of systems based on the case studies performed during the TIGARS project. The key 
message from a policy point and system/risk owneråV point of view is that diversity is important and should 
be introduced systematically and explicitly in the system and development lifecycle. For the developer and 
system architect, there are many options to consider for the ML component including the use of real time 
ensembles, diverse training sets and different tool chains. 
2 Defence in depth and diversity 
Defence in depth and diversity are fundamental to achieving high levels of safety within complex systems. 
Diversity1 is a key concept and diverse redundancy is needed to counter common cause failures and 
epistemic uncertainties. It is a sound and widely used design principle in safety critical applications. Lack of 
diversity was a key factor in the 2003 North American power blackout as non-diverse backup systems failed 
in the same way as the primary systems (p.60 [1]). 
TKH NH\ IacWRU, ZKLcK GHWHUPLQHV KRZ bHQHILcLaO çGHVLJQ GLYHUVLW\è LV, LV WKH failure correlation between 
çGLYHUVHè cRPSRQHQWV. IGHaOO\, ZKHQ RQH RSWV IRU çGHVLJQ GLYHUVLW\è RQH KRSHV WKaW VLPXOWaQHRXV cKaQQHO 
failures either do not occur at all or, if they do, they are rare. A number of studies, e.g. [4][9] with non-ML 
based software demonstrated that the gains from design diversity may be significant but are usually 
significantly lower than one may hope under the assumption that diverse components would fail 
(statistically) independently. 
Some experimental results on the correlation of failures are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1 is 
from a seminal Nasa funded experiment (data from Knight (1986)) that shows the improvement in the 
probability of failure of missile detection algorithm as the mean performance improves. The other (Figure 2) 
is from a software competition with many thousands of entrants and shows the reliability improvement of a 
diverse pair, relative to a single version (from Meulen (2008)). The horizontal axis shows the average 
probability of failure on demand of the pool from which both programs are selected. The vertical axis shows 
the reliability improvement from having a second algorithm. 
The main message from these experiments is that on average one gets one or two orders of magnitude 
improvement in the probability of failure on demand by deploying diverse systems. One explanation for this 
is that independent designers and developers make similar mistakes because of the inherent difficulty of 
the problem that the algorithm is solving. The presence of these correlations and the non-independence of 
failures is a robust result, replicated across experiments sponsored by Nasa, the nuclear industry and 
others. 
                                                             
1 OU GLYHUVH UHGXQGaQc\, çTKH SUHVHQcH RI WZR RU PRUH V\VWHPV RU cRPSRQHQWV WR SHUIRUP aQ identified 
function, where the systems or components have different attributes so as to reduce the possibility of 
cRPPRQ caXVH IaLOXUH, LQcOXGLQJ cRPPRQ PRGH IaLOXUHè. DLYHUVLW\ cRXOG UHVXOW LQ GLIIHUHQW GHYHORSPHQW 
lifecycles, different organisations, anG GLIIHUHQW LPSOHPHQWaWLRQ WHcKQRORJLHV. TKH WHUP çUHGXQGaQc\è 
denotes replicated, sometimes identical, systems or structures e.g. in protecting against fire by having 
identical systems located in different places. 
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Figure 1: Experimental results on diversity 
 
Figure 2: Experimental results on diversity improvement factor 
Defence in depth in the autonomous vehicle context can take a variety of forms â from hardening a 
particular functional block (e.g. by deploying design diversity), to building a resilient architecture optimised 
to detect a failure, confine its impact and recover from failure fast. In addition diversity can be deployed 
within design and V&V teams, between development and assessment organisations, in tool chains to try 
and avoid problems of complex tool reliability and in V&V techniques [5]. 
The principles of how to deploy defence in depth are well-known and discussed widely in safety and security 
related standards and text books ([6][7][8]). For autonomous systems the challenge is how to deploy 
GHIHQcH LQ GHSWK ZLWK ML cRPSRQHQWV. SXcK ML cRPSRQHQWV Pa\ bH XVHG aV çVHQVRUVè LQ a VaIHW\ cKaQQHO 
(e.g. to detect obstacles on the road) and also to implement an essential part of the functionality (e.g. in 
journey planners). 
Diversity studies have been conducted with ML software, too. For instance, a number of studies in the late 
1990s examined the effectiveness of design diversity with ML used for character recognition. In these 
works, e.g. [11], the authors made two observations: 
1. The effectiveness of diversity is affected not only by whether diverse channels fail simultaneously, 
but also whether the failures are identical or not. 
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2. Diversity between channels can be promoted by carefully planning how the channels are trained, 
although the practical advice provided by the authors on how this can be done efficiently is very 
limited. 
3 Defence in depth and diversity in TIGARS 
The TIGARS project investigated the gaps and challenges for the assurance of autonomous road vehicles as 
a whole. Table 1 shows an extract from the gaps and challenges summary table [12] for defence in depth 
and diversity. 
Gaps and 
challenges area 
Topic Project response 
Integration with 
defence in depth 
and diversity 
Understanding how diversity and defence 
in depth can reduce the trust needed in 
specific ML components in the context of 
ML based systems. 
Evaluate probabilistic models of 
resilience and defence in depth in 
the context of ML-based systems 
and the assurance case. 
Investigate the use of defence in 
depth and diversity in ML 
components and within the system 
architecture of RAS. 
Table 1: Defence in depth and diversity: Gaps and Challenges 
TIGARS used two demonstrator systems for the defence in depth and diversity studies. The first is the 
TIGARS Experimental Vehicle (TEV), which is a modified Yamaha golf cart and has a use case of being a taxi 
on private property in which obstacle detection and adaptive cruise control are carried out by the installed 
autonomous systems. Figure 3 shows the physical golf cart after the installation of LIDAR (Light Imaging, 
Detection, And Ranging) and RoboVision camera test equipment. Secondly, Adelard and Nagoya have 
acquired Donkey car autonomous driving vehicles [13]. The Donkey car consists of the body of a Radio 
Control (RC) car, including motor and servo units, controlled by a Raspberry Pi computer and the Donkey 
car autonomous driving software (an open source python package using TensorFlow [14]). 
3.1 Defence in depth and diversity studies on the TEV 
The TEV has a typical Autonomous Vehicle (AV) architecture which we used to investigate some options for 
deploying defence in depth that are known to have been beneficial in other domains, e.g. sensors, 
processing information, algorithms etc. However, the assessment of the effectiveness of defence in depth is 
application specific and crucially depends on the correlation of failures between the diverse layers of 
defence. 
The UML component diagram shown in Figure 3 captures a fragment of an architecture with ML 
components derived from the reaO aUcKLWHcWXUH RI WKH çJROI caUè (TEV), one of the case studies used in the 
TIGARS project. 
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Figure 3: Fragment of TEV architecture 
To improve reliability, both functions are implemented XVLQJ çGLYHUVHè cRPSRQHQWV (V\PPHWULc GLYHUVLW\); 
thus eliminating one type of common cause failure. Diversity in object recognition could be achieved by 
GHSOR\LQJ WZR LPSOHPHQWaWLRQV RI a CNN; WZR çIXQcWLRQaOO\ GLYHUVHè cRPSRQHQWV aUH XVHG IRU WKH GLVWaQce 
measurement function too, one relying on the stereo camera as a sensor and the second on a LIDAR. 
However, the two functions are clearly related (each of the channels implements the same functionality or 
the functionality of the channels is very similar), thus the outcomes from the two functions must be 
consistent: if objects are detected, the distance measurement should return a plausible value; if no objects 
are detected, the distance measurement function should return no value. In case of a disagreement 
between the channels the decision on which of the channels should be trusted is taken by an adjudicator, 
e.g. majority voting. 
This is not possible in the TEV unless an additional channel is added or one of the two channels is trusted 
more than the other and the second channel is advisory (weakening the benefits of the diversity but still 
providing a checker/monitor). The TEV trusted the LIDAR distance information more as long as the object 
detection channels detected a vehicle and the stereo cameraås distance information was used as a checker. 
Assessing the effectiveness of such an arrangement would need a detailed analysis of the failure 
correlation between the two channels: the effectiveness would only be undermined if there were 
circumstances in which the stereo camera would produce correct measurements while the LIDAR-based 
measurement would produce incorrect output. Less common examples of asymmetric systems, e.g. the 
LIDAR being used as a checker of an object recognition system based on a stereo camera, are not covered 
by [15], but the model can be refined to cover the specifics of the TIGARS architecture. 
3.2 Neural network ensembles 
Neural network ensembles (NNE) aGRSW çVRIWZaUH GHVLJQ GLYHUVLW\è LQ neural networks. An NNE uses a 
finite number of individual neural networks for the same learning problem, and the final output is jointly 
decided by all the outputs of these individuals via an adjudicator.  
Diversity is sought by: 
1. diversifying the training data 
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2. diversifying the structure, the objective function used in training and/or even the type of the neural 
networks used in the ensemble 
Broadly the ensembles are trained either LQ SaUaOOHO (çbaJJLQJè) RU sequentiall\ (çbRRVWLQJè). A UHcHQW 
survey of the current state-of-the-art in NNE is given in [10]. 
As part of TIGARS, we also tested an asymmetric ensemble of models in our experimental trials with the 
Donkey car. A baseline ML model was used to perform an initial classification assessment - if the 
autonomous radio controlled car was on a straight or a corner part of the track. This is illustrated in Figure 
4. Our initial results on the offline test bed showed a significant improvement over a single model approach. 
Although, we did notice some confusion factor with the classifier model, where it would send some cases to 
the wrong specialised model, (see [17] for more details on the studies). 
 
Figure 4: Asymmetric diversity model architecture 
Then, we used one of the two more specialised models (one for the corners, another for the straights) to 
provide the output steering angle predictions. This type of asymmetric diversity is highly dependent on the 
classification model being able to differentiate between the two cases well, else there is confusion of which 
specialised model to use, and reduced accuracy and reliability if the incorrect model was used to make the 
output predictions. 
In the AV context the work on asymmetric systems points to two important issues: 
x The insight provided by [15] about the limitations of fault injection experiments may apply in the AV 
context. 
x SRPH IRUP RI WUXVWHG cKHcNHUV aUH aQ HVVHQWLaO SaUW RI WKH çVaIHW\ NHUQHOè IRU WKHP WR bH abOH WR 
guarantee a high level of safety. 
3.2.1 Regression faults in neural network ensembles 
An interesting phenomenon, specific to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), was observed empirically in the 
TIGARS project, which we called "regression faults"2. Regression faults occur with DNNs as a result of 
retraining (additional training) of a DNN; an Illustration is shown in Figure 5 below. The DNN is used to 
classify a communication "session" as either "clean" or "an attack". 
                                                             
2 The name was chosen following the spirit of regression testing in software engineering, the focus of which is to eliminate "regression 
faults", which might be introduced in software in an attempt to fix other software faults. The manifestation of "regression faults" in 
software is part of software functionality that worked correctly before the attempted fix(es) for other software fault(s), but ceases to work 
correctly after the fix(es). Regression testing is meant to remove any "side effects" from the fault-fixing process. 
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Figure 5: An illXVWUaWiRn Rf çUegUeVViRn faXlWVè Rf a DNN VXbjecWed WR UeWUaining 
The plot represents the classification score of a DNN on the testing dataset of 170,603 sessions, which was 
derived from a much larger dataset of ~1,000,000 sessions, taken from the well-known CICIDS2017 dataset 
(https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids-2017.html). We split the initial 1,000,000 sessions into 3 parts: part 1 
amounted to 40% of the data, and was used for initial training of the DNN; part2 also amounted to 40% of 
the overall data, and together with part1, was used to retrain the DNN after the initial training; part 3 used 
the remaining 20% of the data (i.e., the 170,603 sessions shown in Figure 5), and was used as a testing set 
to evaluate the DNN after the initial training (using part1 only) and also after DNN retraining (using both, 
part1 and part 2). 
The classification scores on the testing data are ordered and plotted in Figure 5. The blue line shows the 
scores after the initial training; the orange line shows the scores after retraining. The accuracy, FP and FN 
rates are listed at the bottom of the plot. The accuracy of the DNN grows from 97.7% to 99% as a result of 
the retraining. çD:784è, which is highlighted in the red box in the right bottom corner of the plot, indicates 
the manifestation of çUHJUHVVLRQ IaXOWsè: 784 items in the testing data set, which were classified correctly by 
the DNN trained on part 1 only, became classified incorrectly after the retraining (i.e., when the DNN was 
trained using both, part1 and part2). This is a very small proportion of the test cases <0.5%. 
The existence of "regression faults" is not surprising - the nature of DNN is such that retraining does 
change the weights of the DNN, and in some cases may lead to changes of scores on different data items.  
The phenomenon has some specific implications for applying design diversity and defence in depth when 
some of diverse channels are ML-based. We point to two aspects, which seem important: 
ì "Regression faults" may affect the efficiency of the defence in depth. For instance consider that 
distance measurement in an autonomous vehicle is achieved by deploying two diverse channels - 
one based on an object recognition with a stereo camera and the other based on a LiDAR. 
Retraining the DNN to improve object recognition of the DNN may indeed lead to an improvement 
of object recognition. However, an undesirable consequence of the improvement may be the 
appearance of a "common failure" in the ML-based solution and the LiDAR if the DNN was 
covering for a particular class of failure in the LiDAR channel is no longer able to after the 
retraining. This possibility has not been studied in TIGARS, but the observations to date do not 
provide evidence to rule it out. 
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ì If two or more channels of a diverse solution are ML based (i.e. if an ML-ensemble is used), then 
regression faults pose a new challenge for the verification of the ensemble. Our experiments 
indicate that retraining does lead to improvement of all properties of interest (accuracy, false 
negatives/positives) of a DNN ensemble on average, but we have established empirically that 
regression faults manifest themselves within ensembles too. Further details on these experiments 
with ensembles are provided in [17]. 
The important point here is that on average retraining improves scores, bXW çRQ aYHUaJHè PLJKW QRW be a 
sufficient measure in itself because for diversity evaluation we are also interested in changes to 
correlations. We note that theories are yet to emerge which either demonstrate that benefits from 
retraining are guaranteed to always outweigh the effect of "regression faults" or prove otherwise (i.e., that 
no such guarantees can be given in, at least, some cases or situations). 
4 Recommendations 
The key message from a policy point and system/risk owner point of view is that diversity is important and 
should be introduced systematically and explicitly in the system and development lifecycle. For the 
developer and system architect, there are many options to consider for the ML component including the 
use of real time ensembles, diverse training sets and different tool chains. 
We make the following recommendations: 
1. The use of diversity to improve reliability and safety is a sound principle. In particular it should be 
used to achieve higher dependability of safety mechanisms. The stakeholders for a mobility service 
or deployment of AVs should undertake a review of defence in depth and define a diversity and 
defence in depth strategy balancing the advantages of diversity with possible increases in 
complexity and attack surface. 
2. Diversity should be considered in the system architecture to reduce the trust needed in a single ML 
component. Independence of failures should not be assumed and failure correlation should be 
considered based where possible on experimental data. For example, multiple sensors from 
different manufacturers should be deployed on independent channels within the autonomous 
vehicle. 
3. There are a number of practicable ways in which diversity could be introduced into the ML lifecycle: 
x Software tools - different ML development platforms 
x ML model architectures and use of ensembles 
x Training data sets  
x Organisational diversity should also be considered with the ML development team 
independent from the testing and evaluation team. 
4. The use of diversity to partition the operating regime (e.g. into areas with different types of 
difficulty) should be considered and the benefits of using ensembles and voting should also be 
evaluated. 
5. Care should be taken when retraining DNNs to ensure that any regression faults do not pose new 
sources of potential failures for AVs post retraining. The average performance of the network may 
have improved; however, this could have been at the expense of introducing regression faults.  
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Appendix A ... 
Recent work on difficulty and ensembles 
NNE have been used extensively. "Demand difficulty" â the difficulty of executing a particular demand (data 
point submitted for classification, object recognition, etc.) â is a key concept in diversity as it underlines the 
observed correlation in failures. While in traditional software "difficulty" of a demand is rarely known, with 
the ML-solutions the difficulty can be readily available in a binary classification problem. For instance, 
Figure 5, clearly shows the scores of the individual demands, which vary between "1" (a clean 
communication session) and "0" (malicious communication session). The actual score from the classifier is 
an indication of demand difficulty: demands close to 0 will be confidently classified as "malicious sessions" 
and demands with scores close to "1" will be confidently classified as "clean sessions". We can see that a 
sizeable number of demands have scores which are not a clear cut - the ones which are "in between" with 
scores in the range [0.1, 0.9]. We explored the existence of difficulty and created an ensemble as follows: 
Observations about interpretation of the score from a binary classified as a measure of "difficulty" of 
demands have been made (see [16]), but we are not aware of a systematic use of "difficulty" (confidence). In 
TIGARS, we developed a boosting algorithm to create an ensemble consisting of several models, which may 
vary between two and an arbitrary number. 
The ensemble is constructed as follows: 
1. Model 0 is trained on a training data set, T0, which includes 50% of the available data set. Post 
training, T0 is evaluated with the trained DNN to obtain the individual classification scores of the 
data points. We then split the T0 training set into two subsets for a predefined range of demand 
scores [a, b]: T0_easy - if a demand D has scores, S(D) < a or S(D) > b (within our confidence 
range). T0_difficult - If instead demand has score outside the range S(D)  [a, b] (outside our 
confidence range). Intuitively, T0_easy contains the demands which are easier for the classifier to 
classify and T0_difficult contains the demands that are more difficult for the classifier to classify 
(i.e. the classification is less confident than those for the demands in T0_easy).3 
2. Model 1 is now trained using the T0_difficult data set. Intuitively, this model is trained to cope 
better with the cases which Model 0 finds difficult. This arrangement can be extended further, by 
splitting T0_difficult further into subsets which Model 1 finds easy or difficult to classify. 
Eventually, we will have a set of models: Model 0, Model 1, Model 2, etc. which are meant to complement 
one another. The adjudicator of the models is based on the classification score, which is summarised in 
Table 2. The dashes indicate that that particular model does not see the input as it is not required to 
classify the demand, since it is within the confidence range of a previous model in the ensemble. 
 Model 0 score Model 1 score Model 2 score NNE output 
 
 
 
S1(D) < a - - 0 (Model 0) 
S1(D) > b - - 1 (Model 0) 
 S2(D) < a - 0 (Model 1) 
                                                             
3 The essential difference between the boosting algorithms, e.g. ADaBoost, Is that instead of using the scores of data on M0 to change 
the weights of the training data when training M0, we exclude the "easy" for M0 cases altogether from the training set used to train M1 
and M1 will only be used when M0 fails to provide a confident classification. 
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Demand, D 
 
 
 
S1(D)  [a, b] 
(demand too 
difficult for Model 
0) 
S2(D) > b - 1 (Model 1) 
S2(D)  [a, b] 
(demand too 
difficult for Model 
1) 
S3(D) < a 0 (Model 3) 
S3(D) > b 1 (Model 3) 
S3(D)  [a, b] S3(D) (Model 3) 
Table 2: Truth table for an adjudicator  
As one can see, the NNE output may come from any of the deployed models (M0, M1 or M2 in this 
particular example), depending on the "difficulty" of a demand for the respective individual models. If a 
demand is "easy" for Model 0, then Model 1 and Model 2 will not even see the particular demand. If Model 0 
finds the demand difficult to classify, then Model 1 is called upon to classify the demand and based on the 
difficulty, Model 2 may even be called. 
We found that the ensemble brought significant benefits over a single model using the CICIDS2017 to 
classify malicious network sessions. 
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1 Introduction 
This document details the guidance for security-informed safety (SIS) analysis. We outline the issue for 
autonomous vehicles and provide some guidance on the deployment of the use of defence in depth and 
diversity for these types of systems based on the case studies performed during the TIGARS project. 
2 Landscape 
Security and safety have often been treated as separate disciplines, with their own regulation, standards, 
culture and engineering. Security requirements for vehicles are addressed in standards, such as PAS 1885 
[1] and ISO 26262 [2], but not in an integrated way with safety, particularly the impact of functional safety 
requirements on security and the possible hazardous consequences from an attack or intrusion of the 
system. 
This approach is no longer feasible as there is a growing understanding that security and safety are closely 
interconnected: it is no longer acceptable to assume that a safety system is immune from malware because 
it is built using bespoke hardware and software, or that it cannot be attacked because it is separated from 
Whe RXWVLde ZRUOd b\ aQ çaLU gaSè. 
In reality, the existence of the air gap is often a myth (see [4][5]). Furthermore, autonomous systems rely on 
data and software with uncertain provenance and are not designed for high integrity applications. A safety 
justification, or safety case, is incomplete and unconvincing without a consideration of the impact of 
security. 
The impact of cyber issues is exacerbated by the increasing sophistication of attackers, the 
commoditisation of low-end attacks, and the increasing vulnerabilities of digital systems as well as their 
connectivity â both designed and inadvertent. The cybersecurity compromises of automobiles have been 
steadily increasing, the Jeep attack and Tesla of a few years ago are no longer isolated incidents. Recently 
there has been an increased focus on attacking servers of the manufacturers that cars are becoming 
increasingly connected to. Such attacks are just examples of the type of adversaries a holistic safety case 
needs to address. 
For example, the following areas are particularly significant from a security perspective and need more 
scrutiny in a security-informed justification of a safety system. 
1. Integration and interaction of requirements, e.g. of safety, with security and resilience 
supported by security-informed hazard analysis techniques. 
2. Supply-chain integrity, e.g. mitigating the risks of devices being supplied compromised or 
having egregious vulnerabilities. 
3. Malicious events post-deployment that will also change in nature and scope as the threat 
environment changes, and a corresponding need to consider prevention (e.g. implementing a 
risk-based patching policy) but also recovery and resilience. 
4. Weakening of security controls as the capabilities of the attacker and technology change. This 
may have a major impact on the proposed lifetime of installed equipment and design for 
refurbishment and change.  
5. Reduced lifetime of installed equipment as there is a weakening of security controls as 
aWWacNeUVå caSabLOLWLeV aQd WechQRORgLeV chaQge. 
6. Threats to the effectiveness and independence of safety barriers and defence in depth. 
7. Design changes to address user interactions, training, configuration, and software 
vulnerabilities and patching. These might lead to additional functional requirements for 
security controls. 
8. Possible exploitation of the device/service to attack itself or other systems and the need for 
confidentiality of design and deployment information. 
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9. The trustworthiness and provenance of the evidence offered. 
Table 1: Security-informed safety issues 
There are technical drivers to integrate security into safety analyses â because of the interactions and 
trade-offs that are necessary to consider. For example, at the requirements stage, we might need to 
consider the security aspects of the information flow policy when a plant is under attack, or if degraded 
plant conditions impact the safety. Another type of issue that we might need to consider at the architecture 
level is whether a highly critical third party component has sufficient security provenance given its supply 
chain. Safety assessment involves building trust with the supply chain, visiting their factories and assessing 
their culture: these are all aspects highly relevant to security as well as safety. 
3 Security-informed safety in TIGARS 
The TIGARS project investigated the gaps and challenges for the assurance of autonomous road vehicles as 
a whole. Table 4 in Appendix A shows the gaps and challenges for security-informed safety identified in 
TIGARS and our project response to them. 
Our work on security-informed safety focused around the demonstrator systems. The TIGARS Experimental 
Vehicle (TEV), which is a modified Yamaha golf cart and has a use case of being a taxi on private property in 
which obstacle detection and adaptive cruise control are carried out by the installed autonomous systems, 
was used as a case study to apply PAS 11281 (see Section 3.1) and also an example for a security-informed 
Hazops (see Section 3.2). 
3.1 Applying PAS 11281 to TEV 
In 2018, Adelard developed a code of practice and a publicly available specification (PAS 11281 [3]) for 
security-informed safety in the railway and automotive sectors respectively. These documents capture and 
record our knowledge of best practice for security-informed safety in the form of concrete 
recommendations and guidance, with references to more detailed guidance and standards as appropriate. 
PAS 11281: Connected automotive ecosystems â Impact of security on safety gives recommendations for 
managing security risks that might lead to a compromise of safety in a connected automotive ecosystem. 
The PAS covers both the entire connected automotive ecosystem and its constituent systems throughout 
their lifetimes (including manufacturing, supply chain and maintenance activities). We focused on the 
application specific to autonomous vehicles as all levels of vehicle automation and autonomy are in the 
scope of the document. Security in the supply chain can be rather difficult for vehicles as they tend to be 
very complicated and involve many organisations; the PAS attempts to address this issue by promoting the 
çgRRd c\beU cLWL]eQè aSSURach ZheUe eYeU\RQe SURPRWeV gRRd VecXULW\ SUacWLceV LQ WheLU SURdXcWV aQd Whe 
ecosystem as a whole becomes more secure. 
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The PAS clauses address 
1. Security policy, organization and culture 
2. Security-aware development process 
3. Maintaining effective defences 
4. Incident management 
5. Secure and safe design 
6. Contributing to a safe and secure world 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of PAS 
 
Although the findings of the case study showed that the vehicle development only addresses security in a 
preliminary manner, security is a fundamental and integral attribute to the technical themes of the project 
in the requirements, V&V, and assurance research. It was understood that security would be addressed 
more vigorously as the project matured during its life cycle. 
3.2 Security-informed hazard analysis 
One of the key topics in PAS 11281 is the impact of security on risk assessment covering the whole life cycle 
of the vehicle. The PAS states that security concerns could have an impact on: 
1. the system boundaries; 
2. what systems could potentially affect safety; 
3. the stakeholders involved; and 
4. the validity of design safety assumptions. 
Therefore, care must be taken during the analysis to account for security concerns as well as safety. Table 2 
summarises a 7-step risk assessment process: in TIGARS we applied Step 4 to the TEV. 
Step Brief description 
Step 1 – Establish system 
context and scope of 
assessment 
Describe the system to be assessed and its relationship with other 
systems and the environment. Identify the services provided by the system 
and the system assets. Agree the scope of and motivation for the 
assessment and identify the stakeholders and their communication 
needs. Identify the type of decisions being supported by the assessment. 
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Step Brief description 
Step 2 – Configure risk 
assessment 
Identify any existing analyses, e.g. safety cases, business continuity 
assessments that provide details of the system, the impact of failure and 
the mitigations that are in place. Characterise the maturity of the systems 
or project and the key uncertainties. 
Ensure that the risk assessment is focused on the kinds of threats that 
are of concern. Define possible threat sources and identify potential threat 
scenarios. Refine generic capability and impact levels for the systems 
being assessed. Identify risk criteria. 
Refine and focus system models in the light of the threat scenarios and 
existing analyses to ensure that they are at the right level of detail for an 
effective security-informed risk analysis. 
Step 3 – Analyse policy 
interactions 
Undertake an analysis of policy issues considering interactions between 
safety requirements and security policies. Resolve any conflicts, show that 
the trade-offs are satisfactory and document the decisions made. 
Step 4 – Preliminary risk 
analysis 
Undertake architecture based risk analysis, identifying potential hazards 
and consequences and relevant vulnerabilities and causes together with 
any intrinsic mitigations and controls. Consider doubts and uncertainties, 
data and evidence needs. Identify intrinsic and engineered defence in 
depth and resilience. 
Step 5 – Identify specific 
attack scenarios 
Refine preliminary risk analysis to identify specific attack scenarios. Focus 
on large consequence events and differences with respect to the existing 
system. 
Step 6 – Focused risk 
analysis 
Prioritise attack scenarios according to the capabilities required and the 
potential consequences of the attack. As with the previous step, the focus 
is on large consequence events and differences with respect to the 
existing system. 
Step 7 – Finalise risk 
assessment 
Finalise risk assessment by reviewing implications and options arising 
from focused risk analysis. Review defence in depth and undertake 
sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. Consider whether the design threat 
assumptions are appropriate. Identify additional mitigations and controls. 
Table 2: 7-step security-informed safety risk assessment 
There are a variety of initiatives to integrate security into hazard analyses. We have been using security- (or 
cyber-) informed Hazard analysis and operability studies (Hazops) [8] to assess architectures of industrial 
systems [10], and adapt this well-known approach for performing a safety hazard analysis in a systematic 
fashion [9], analysing the deviations of data flows and values between different interconnections in the 
system. To account for security in a security-informed Hazops, additional security guidewords are added 
and an enhanced multidisciplinary team (system safety and security experts) is used. Both security and 
safety perspectives are needed to assess the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited and the 
effectiveness and consequences of their mitigations. 
During TIGARS, we also performed a security-informed Hazops on the TEV architecture. This process is 
similar to the Hazops safety analysis with the addition of malicious security acts included in the possible 
causes of a hazard. We used a standard set of data flow and data value guidewords and reviewed key 
components of the architecture to understand the potential hazards in the system. The credibility and 
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likelihood of a successful attack on the system depends on the capability level of the threat actor. We 
decided to consider threat actors with sophisticated capability and expert knowledge of the system. After 
all, once the vehicle is available for purchase there is nothing stopping a would be adversary from 
purchasing a target vehicle to acquire detailed knowledge and have a test bed for their attacks. 
Figure 2 shows the simplified architecture that was used for the security-informed safety Hazops of the 
TEV. We focused on the interfaces which involved machine learning components, such as Object Detection 
and Fusion (denoted as 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 2). These components have additional complexity and differ 
from traditional components in road vehicles. It should be noted that the TEV is a research and 
development vehicle and not developed to any automotive standards. 
 
Figure 2: Overall architecture of the TEV 
We found that security issues could pose credible threats to ML components if the inputs or outputs were 
able to be modified by the threat actor. We would expect real world autonomous vehicles (AVs to be more 
mature systems with additional security hardening than the TEV in our case study; however, security should 
still be considered during the risk assessment and design of the AV. Our hazard analysis highlighted some 
additional alarms and monitoring that could be added to the TEV to help annunciate potential failures and 
problems of the ML components. 
An example extract from the hazard analysis summary for component 1 is shown in Table 3. 
Guideword Interruption Causes Hazard Mitigations 
Data flow: No 
action 
No image from 
camera 
C1: Hardware 
failure 
C2: Lens 
tampering 
H3: Spurious 
safety stopping  
M1: LIDAR cross-check 
M2: Pre-test checks 
R1: Diagnostic for 
camera feed failure 
R2: Diagnostic check for 
image quality 
Table 3: Extract from hazard log summary of TEV for data flow 1 
Table 3 shows a traditional hardware reliability cause with a more security focused cause both having 
possible contributing factors to a hazard. From this record in the Hazops, we made the recommendations 
that diagnostic checks should be added to check that the camera feed is alive and assess the quality of the 
image from the camera. 
The hazard is because upon failure of the ACC the TEV will enter into an emergency stop procedure. Having 
this function activated too often represents a hazard for the system. 
The other more traditional components without ML in the system are still susceptible to security 
compromise; for example if falsified/altered data was sent to the planner setting target speed it would be 
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possible to crash the TEV into obstacles that the LIDAR sensors had detected, or even spuriously apply the 
emergency brake at opportune moments; the centre of a traffic junction could be a hazardous place to stop. 
4 Guidance for security-informed safety in autonomous vehicles 
Overall security-informed safety is not generally explicitly addressed in current AVs, and hence, the 
motivation for PAS 11281, let alone in a prototype vehicle being studied. However, security requirements 
may be partially met in mature implementation of the vehicle being studied. Overall, we consider the PAS 
will be challenging for industry. The results from applying the PAS in our case study may have been 
different if the TEV was not partly a research vehicle and a more mature system was being developed. 
The deployment of autonomous technologies may follow an innovation cycle that first focuses on 
functionality and seeks to progressively add additional assurance and security. This will make the 
development of the assurance and safety cases and associated security and safety risk assessments 
particularly challenging. From our experience with the project we currently recommend: 
1. Explicitly define the innovation cycle and assess the impact and feasibility of adding assurance and 
security. Adapt the 7-step risk assessment process to the specific lifecycle being used. 
2. Address the approach to security-informed safety at all stages of the innovation cycle, including 
undertaking a security-informed hazard analysis during development. The hazard analysis should 
be reviewed periodically during operation or when a safety related component has been updated or 
additional threat or vulnerability information becomes available. 
3. If safety, security and resilience requirements are largely undefined at the start of the innovation 
cycle, the feasibility of progressively identifying them during the innovation cycle should be 
assessed, together with the issues involved in evolving the architecture and increasing the 
assurance evidence. 
4. Apply PAS 11281 to systematically identify the issues. If this is not possible because of the lack of 
defined processes or availability of information, consider a partial and project specific 
implementation of the PAS to meet the innovation cycle. 
5. Collect experience in developing a security-informed safety case and in integrating security issues 
into the safety analyses needed to implement the PAS. In the industry as a whole, we believe that 
more training and expertise for SIS analysis is required, as many decisions rely on expert 
judgement, but the methodology that has been developed in other sectors is applicable to 
autonomous vehicles. 
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Appendix A … 
Gaps and challenges for SIS analysis 
Gap and challenge 
area 
Topic Project response â next steps 
Security needs to be 
addressed throughout 
the lifecycle 
Governance and policies on 
project rather than 
institutional basis. 
The approach needs to 
address the innovation cycle. 
Define an innovation cycle and research 
feasibility of progressive application of PAS. 
Assurance cases and 
risks analysis 
Need to integrate security 
into the safety case. 
Need for analysis techniques 
that integrate security and 
safety. 
The TIGARS CAE based assurance framework 
allows this to be done in principle. Develop 
and review framework after application. 
Review and consider applying the security-
informed safety case process currently being 
developed to one of the experimental vehicles. 
This includes a risks analysis approach. Work 
with partners on understanding the differing 
approaches of STPA-SEC and security-
informed Hazops. 
Supply chain Provenance of supply chain a 
generic issue. 
In TIGARS consider the following ML issues: 
Supply chain of ML based systems 
Training data 
Open source ML systems 
Complex tool chain 
Composition of cases How to compose systems and 
assurance of heterogeneous 
COTS subsystems. 
Specific to security aspects of these types of 
systems. 
Table 4: Security-informed safety: Gaps and challenges 
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1  Introduction 
This document gives an overview of International Standards and guideline documents relevant to assurance 
of RASs. This is a snapshot; the landscape is changing quickly as a number of activities have only started in 
the past year or two and are going to produce documents shortly. The documents are classified into three 
groups: on systems assurance (Section 2) including system life cycle processes, on AI and ML in general 
(Section 3) and on RASs (Section 4). Our recommendations are presented in Section 5, and references are 
in Section 6. 
2 International Standards on systems assurance and related documents 
Top level International Standards on systems assurance and related documents are developed by ISO/IEC 
JTC 1/SC 7 Software and systems engineering [64] and IEC TC 56 Dependability [65]. The former develops and 
maintains the International Standards on assurance and system life cycle processes and the latter is 
responsible for standards on dependability. 
The International Standard on systems assurance is ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026 Systems and software assurance 
that consists of four parts: Part 1 – Concepts and vocabulary [3], Part 2 – Assurance case [4] (revision work to 
start in 2020), Part 3 – System integrity levels [5] and Part 4 – Assurance in the life cycle [6] (revision work in 
progress). The Part 4 provides guidance and recommendations for assurance of a given claim about the 
system-of-interest. The guidance and recommendations of Part 4 are given for life cycle processes of the 
system-of-interest, rather than for the system, because of the need to support a claim of type çThe deployed 
system will continue to perform as required in futureè, as recommended in the TIGARS topic paper on 
assurance [7]. Such a claim is itself about the system-of-interest, but typically derives descendant claims 
on the life cycle of the deployed system. Note that the definition of the term assurance in the AAIP BoK [66] 
and that in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-1 [3] differs: the former defines assurance as justified confidence while the 
latter defines it as grounds of confidence. 
For the definition of the set of system life cycle processes, ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-4 normatively refers to 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 System life cycle processes [1] and ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 Software life cycle processes [2], 
which are augmented by the multi-part guideline standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 24748 Life cycle management; in 
particular, its Part 1 [10] and Part 2 [11] contain the clarification of some concepts in [1] and [2]. The set of 
information items (documentations) relevant to each system life cycle process provided by [1] and [2] is 
identified by ISO/IEC/IEEE 15289 Content of life cycle information items (documentation) [9], which can be 
used as evidence in assurance arguments for the system-of-interest and in derived arguments for its life 
cycle. 
It is often appropriate to consider an RAS as a System of Systems (SoS). Three International Standards 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 21839 System of systems (SoS) considerations in life cycle stages of a system [12], ISO/IEC/IEEE 
21840 Guidelines for the utilization of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 in the context of System of Systems (SoS) [13] and 
ISO/IEC/IEEE Taxonomy of systems of systems [14] were published in succession in 2019; they together 
provide the basic concepts regarding life cycles of SoS referring to [1]. The four degrees of managerial and 
operational independence standardised by [14] à la Maier [15] may help clarify the complex structure of 
RASs. 
IEC 60050-192 International Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV) for dependability [22] defines dependability as 
the çability to perform as and when requiredè. The term dependability is used as a collective term for the 
time-related quality characteristics of an item. It includes availability, recoverability, maintainability and 
supportability, and in some cases other characteristics such as safety, security and durability. As such 
dependability has a special role in assurance activities. 
The top level standards of IEC TC 56 Dependability are IEV [22] and IEC 60300-1 Dependability management - 
Part 1: Guidance for management and application [21] (revision to start in 2020). The latter evolves the 
definition of dependability relevant concepts by providing guidance for management and application of 
dependability. IEC 62853 Open systems dependability [23] augments [21] with considerations for open 
systems (an open system is one whose boundaries, functions and structure change over time and is 
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recognized and described differently from various points of view) of which RASs are naturally considered as 
instances. 
The principal application of RAS assurance is safety. As a result of recent development of communication 
technology, safety and security are considered as inseparable with each other. BSI has recently published a 
new set of guidelines for security informed safety BSI PAS 11281:2018 Connected automotive ecosystems. 
Impact of security on safety. Code of practice [20]. 
Standards introduced in this section are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 International Standards related to assurance 
3 Standards and guidelines on AI 
This section introduces standards and guidelines on AI in general, leaving RAS specific ones to Section 4.  
OECD Council adopted a recommendation on AI [53] at Ministerial level on 22 May 2019 on the proposal of 
the Committee on Digital Economy Policy (CDEP). This adoption itself shows how high the impact of AI 
technology is recognised by OECD. Its recommendation consists of five Principles (Inclusive growth, 
sustainable development and well-being; Human-centred values and fairness; Transparency and 
explainability; Robustness, security and safety; and Accountability) and five National policies and 
international co-operation (Investing in AI research and development; Fostering a digital ecosystem for AI; 
Shaping an enabling policy environment for AI; Building human capacity and preparing for labour market 
transformation; and International co-operation for trustworthy AI). These lists are at a human-centred level 
including accountability, rather than at an engineering level. 
The World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) [54] is an advisory 
body and forum of reflection that was set up by UNESCO in 1998. It has published reports on extensive 
target fields that stems from space to water, including robotics [55]. It published Preliminary study on the 
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence [56]. IoT is included in its Work Programme 2018 – 2019. 
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 Artificial Intelligence [59] was established in October 2017. As this group was only 
recently established, SC 42 has not yet published many International Standards except for standards on big 
data, but it has currently three Accepted Work Items (AWIs) for development of International Standards: 
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Governance implications of the use of artificial intelligence by organizations [24], Process management 
framework for Big data analytics [25] and Risk Management [26]. It also has the following AWIs and New 
Projects (NP) for development of technical report: Overview of trustworthiness in Artificial Intelligence [27], 
Overview of computational approaches for AI systems [28], Overview of ethical and societal concerns [29] and 
Use cases [30]. As for testing of AI systems in general, ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7/WG 26 Testing is developing 
ISO/IEC/TR 29119-11 Testing of AI-based systems [31]. 
There are study activities on ethics in AI and its applications by governments and International 
Standardisation bodies: the High-Level Expert Group on AI in European Commission, which presented 
Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence [39], ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 WG 3 Trustworthiness [59], 
IEC SEG 10 Ethics in Autonomous and Artificial Intelligence Applications [32] and The IEEE global initiative for 
ethical considerations in AI and autonomous systems [60][61][62]. 
General guidelines for AI development and testing for improvement of AI systems quality can provide a 
basis for assurance arguments. Googleås guidelines [35] describes recommended practices for developing 
AI systems based on their own experience of assurance in their projects. Google also provides a set of 
online ML development rules [36] based on their own experience. There are other RAS specific guidelines 
published by private sectors (See Section 4). 
The StandICT.eu project report [53] provides a summary of international activities in AI from a more general 
viewpoint than this document. 
4 Standards and guidelines on RAS 
This section deals with standards and guidelines on RAS that employ AI technology. Standards and 
guidelines are introduced in two classes: requirements and testing (Section 4.1) and safety assurance 
(Section 4.2). 
4.1 Requirements and Testing of RAS 
There are some standards that instantiate general standards on requirements and testing to RASs and 
tailor them when necessary. For example, ISO 22737 [41], which is being developed by ISO/TC 204 
Intelligent transport systems, is a standard for requirements and testing of Low-speed automated driving 
(LSAD) systems. Another example is IEEE P7009 [58] on Fail-Safe design requirements for RAS. 
There are also attempts to introduce aspects that do not exist in the available standards. For instance, 
ISO/PAS 21448 [43] Safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF) for autonomous road vehicles developed by 
ISO/TC 22/SC 32 [63] plans to derive safety requirements from the functionality intended by the 
manufacturer, which is an aspect not covered by traditional safety standards, but is necessary for safety of 
RASs. 
There are activities to establish forum standards on safety of autonomous driving systems. For example, 
Safety First for Automated Driving (SaFAD) [49] released by eleven mobility and automotive industry bodies, 
provides a framework for automated passenger vehicles. SaFAD is a non-binding organised framework for 
the development, testing and validation of safe automated passenger vehicles. Another example is the 
Association for Standardization of Automation and Measuring Systems (ASAM) who are developing a series 
of OpenX standards on file formats used for exchanging data in testing of autonomous vehicles, such as a 
format for logical description of road networks (OpenDrive [44]), a series of open file formats and open 
source tools for the detailed description, creation and evaluation of road surfaces (OpenCRG [45]) and one 
for the description of dynamic contents in driving simulation applications (OpenSCENARIO [46]). 
Some research papers are relevant to building standards and guidelines on assurance of RASs. 
Requirements definition and validation of RAS is discussed by Koopman and Wagner [33], which suggests to 
prepare two sets of requirements: a set of ML training data, which accordingly pertains to ML elements, and 
another set of more traditional requirements; the two sets are to be used in parallel with a formal monitor 
that manages and restricts the ML output. Salay and Czarnecki [37] provide detailed analysis of the 
automotive ISO 26262 [19] standard regarding the software requirements and testing for machine learning 
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systems; it proposes the use of tangible partial formal specifications, where possible, to provide plausibility 
checks, for example, pedestrian height or distance from the vehicle.  
4.2 Safety assurance of RAS 
For sector-wide certification, UL (Underwriters Laboratories) is developing UL 4600: The First 
Comprehensive Safety Standard for Autonomous Products [48]. The draft is under ballot. This standard has 
comprehensive guidance for achieving safety assurance of RASs by repeatable assessment of safety cases 
through a system life cycle.  
There are national research projects in Germany and United States. The German research project 
PEGASUS aims for a model of scenarios with six independent layers and safety argumentation framework 
[50][51][52]. The DARPA's Assuring Autonomy project [34] aims for a methodology for building assurance 
cases using run-time monitoring of requirements, where an assurance case is built depending on and 
parameterized in conditional evidence which is given during development stage but is replaced based on 
the value measured with respect to the actual system and changing environment and updated according to 
the monitoring. 
Some additional assurance frameworks are proposed. FiveAI published [40] intended to establish a basis 
for certification of Highly Automated Vehicles. They put emphasis on certification, verification and 
validation. There are attempts to form frameworks for RAS safety cases. The Safety Critical Systems Club 
(SCSC) is developing guidance [47] for safety of autonomous systems including a three-level framework: 
computational level (e.g. Route planning), autonomy architecture level (e.g. Sensor health checks, Sanity 
checks on generated route) and platform level (e.g. Self-driving car). 
Uber Advanced Technologies Groupås approach to the safe development of self-driving vehicle technology 
[38] is an internal guideline of Uber. It is a result of their self-review of safety approach reflecting their own 
experience of an accident. 
5 Recommendations 
1. Duplication of standardisation work on the same topic should be reduced to the minimum because it 
can result in inconsistency, as already observed in international standardisation activities for many 
years. 
We observe that some RAS relevant topics have multiple standards. An example of possible duplication 
is in risk management. ISO SC 262 [42] is devoted to risk management, and there is a planned standard 
in the artificial intelligence context [26] developed by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 and a published standard in 
the software and systems engineering context [16] developed by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7. 
Another example is trustworthiness and dependability. ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 has WG 3 trustworthiness 
and IEC TC 56 is devoted to dependability; the two concepts seem to be in close relationship. 
2. An authoritative and introductory guideline covering necessary knowledge for the whole area of RAS 
should be developed for new entrants to this arena. Particularly, the guideline should include survey on 
foundational standards of the safety field. 
Many IT companies are entering into the market without the experience of the traditional 
manufacturers. The current lack of overall guidelines runs the danger that they will concentrate too 
much on their strength in a particular area without necessary knowledge. Because of the speed and 
scale of advancement of RAS engineering, many guidance documents are circulated in varying maturity 
at present. The recommended guideline would help ensure that their new technologies and traditional 
engineering fit together. 
3. There are AI and ML specific issues that are particularly difficult to solve, such as testing of ML based 
system, treating human factors in the context of AI, adaptation of ML, treatment of learning data, and 
their mixture. Standards to help solving these issues should be developed, with priority over those that 
only make obvious specialisation where existing general standards would not solve the difficult issues. 
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